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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1958 
______________ 
 
JAMIL COOPER, 
   Appellant  
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
JOHN WETZEL 
MARIROSA LAMAS; 
KURT GRANLUND; 
SERGEANT STROHM; 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHEMAN, all in their official capacities 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 1-12-cv-01186) 
District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane 
______________ 
 
Argued October 3, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 21, 2018) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent.   
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Selby P. Brown, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Stephen D. Brown, Esq.  
Dechert 
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18th Floor, Cira Centre 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
Counsel for Appellant** 
 
Joseph G. Fulginiti, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
Office of Chief Counsel 
1920 Technology Parkway 
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 
 
Counsel for Appellees 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Jamil Cooper appeals the District Court’s orders granting summary 
judgment to Defendants and denying Plaintiff’s motions to postpone consideration of the 
summary judgment motion and to compel answers to interrogatories.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will vacate in part and affirm in part. 
I 
A 
Cooper was an inmate at State Correctional Institution Rockville (“SCI-
Rockville”), where he served as Block Representative for housing A Block.  On 
September 6, 2011, an officer ordered Cooper to assist inmate Kristian Diaz Cruz.  Diaz 
Cruz is blind and wanted to file a grievance with the prison superintendent regarding how 
                                                                
** Attorneys for Appellant appeared pro bono, and their service is in the highest 
traditions of our profession.  We thank them for their representation in this case.  
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the officers were treating him and handling his insulin injections.  While Cooper and 
Diaz Cruz were seated together, Correctional Officer Sherman walked by and called out 
to Cooper, “So you think you know how to write people up!”  App. 0153, 0176.   
The same day, Sherman completed a misconduct report charging Cooper with 
refusing to obey an order and being present in an unauthorized area.  According to the 
report, Sergeant Strohm ordered all inmates to return to their cells, but Cooper continued 
to loiter.  Sherman again ordered him to his cell, but Cooper instead went to the control 
bubble seeking a pass to go to the library.  Sherman’s report states that Cooper committed 
the same offenses on August 13, 2011.  Nothing indicates that Cooper was served with 
the September 6, 2011 report.   
On September 7, 2011, Sherman wrote another misconduct report, charging 
Cooper with refusing to obey another one of Strohm’s orders to return to his cell and 
being present in an unauthorized area.  The September 7, 2011 report referenced 
Cooper’s alleged misconduct on September 6, 2011.  Cooper was served with the 
September 7, 2011 report.  That day, Sherman called Cooper names, cursed at him in 
front of other inmates, and implied that he was a snitch.  In response, on September 8, 
2011, Cooper filed a grievance against Sherman and met with Unit Manager Kurt 
Granlund.     
Cooper states that during 2011 he had complained to prison officials that Granlund 
acted unprofessionally, was biased, and did not intervene in housing matters.  With 
respect to the misconduct reports, Cooper asserts that Granlund did not permit him to see 
the September 6, 2011 misconduct report until Cooper signed an Informal Resolution 
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Action Form.  After Cooper signed the form, Granlund told Cooper he was guilty of 
misconduct without providing any findings of fact or giving Cooper a chance to explain 
his version of the events.  Granlund gave Cooper fourteen days’ cell restriction.  Cooper 
unsuccessfully appealed the misconduct.  A few weeks later, Granlund dismissed 
Cooper’s grievance against Sherman.     
B 
Cooper filed a pro se complaint and an amended complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Defendants Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, John Wetzel, Marirosa Lamas, Kurt Granlund, Sergeant 
Strohm, and Correctional Officer Sherman.  Cooper claims that Defendants retaliated 
against him for assisting Diaz Cruz and complaining about Granlund, and that he was 
denied procedural due process in his misconduct proceedings.1     
Pursuant to the Standing Practice Order and the Middle District’s local rules, 
discovery was scheduled to begin the day the last pleading was filed and would run six 
months from that date.  Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), and the District Court stayed discovery pending the resolution of that 
motion.  The Court dismissed all but Cooper’s First Amendment and Due Process 
retaliation claims, Defendants filed their answer, and the six-month discovery period 
commenced on May 9, 2014.   
                                                                
1 Cooper also brought conspiracy and defamation claims, which have been 
dismissed.  See generally Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 1:CV–12–1186, 2014 
WL 1600037 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2014).  Cooper does not challenge that ruling. 
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After discovery ended, Defendants moved for summary judgment.  In response, 
Cooper moved the District Court to postpone consideration of the summary judgment 
motion and thereafter filed an opposition brief, together with a response to Defendants’ 
statement of undisputed material facts, affidavits, and supporting exhibits.  The Court 
considered Cooper’s untimely materials but denied his motion to postpone consideration 
of the summary judgment motion, concluding that, based on his response to the motion, it 
appeared he no longer needed time to obtain evidence and/or the evidence he claimed to 
need was not “essential to justify his opposition.”  Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 
1:12-CV-01186, 2015 WL 9268425, at *1-3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2015).   
On the day the District Court denied Cooper’s motion to postpone, it docketed his 
motion to compel answers to interrogatories.  The District Court denied Cooper’s motion 
to compel and granted summary judgment for Defendants.  On the motion to compel, the 
Court found that Cooper took no action to cure his dissatisfaction with Defendants’ 
interrogatory answers for more than a year after discovery closed and more than nineteen 
months after receiving the responses.     
With respect to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the Court concluded that 
Cooper had “not established that he had a constitutional right to assist other inmates,” and 
thus no jury could conclude that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising a 
constitutional right.”  Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 1:12-CV-01186, 2016 WL 
1271327, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016).  Cooper appeals. 
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II2 
A 
Our review of an order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013). We apply the same 
standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making reasonable inferences in the non-
movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material 
only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. County 
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
We review case management orders, like orders denying motions to withhold 
consideration of summary judgment and orders denying motions to compel discovery, for 
abuse of discretion.  See Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 354 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (motions to compel and scope of discovery).  Therefore, we will not disturb 
the District Court’s rulings on these motions unless they were “arbitrary, fanciful or 
                                                                
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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clearly unreasonable,” and “no reasonable person would adopt [its] view.”  Stecyk v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).  
B 
1 
 We will first consider whether the District Court properly granted Defendants 
summary judgment on Cooper’s retaliation claim.  A prisoner alleging retaliation must 
establish a prima facie case that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; 
“(2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his 
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to 
discipline him.”  Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub 
nom., Coutts v. Watson, 137 S. Ct. 2295 (2017).  If the prisoner establishes each of these 
elements, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it “would have made the 
same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.”  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).  
2 
 With respect to the first element, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct at 
issue is constitutionally protected.  Cooper asserts that he has a constitutional right to 
assist a fellow inmate to file a grievance.  Generally, prisoners do not have a First 
Amendment right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners.  See Shaw v. Murphy, 
532 U.S. 223, 230-32 (2001) (declining to extend constitutional protection to inmate-
inmate legal communications, instead applying the test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 89 (1987), under which prisons can limit conduct if the regulation is reasonably 
Case: 16-1958     Document: 003113092216     Page: 7      Date Filed: 11/21/2018
 8 
 
related to a legitimate penological interest).  After the District Court ruled on Defendants’ 
motion, our Court held that where prisoner-to-prisoner legal assistance “was both 
pursuant to [the plaintiff’s] job duties [at the prison] and in accordance with prison 
regulations, [and] was not inconsistent with legitimate penological interests,” such 
assistance “could fall within the limited First Amendment rights that prisoners retain.”  
Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2017). 
In Wisniewski, we concluded that an Inmate Legal Reference Aide, who was 
responsible for assisting other inmates with the filing of legal documents and grievances, 
had engaged in constitutionally protected conduct pursuant to his job duties.  See id. at 
155-56.  Cooper asserts that his role as a Block Representative is analogous to the role of 
an Inmate Legal Reference Aide.  Cooper submitted an affidavit stating that as a Block 
Representative, it was his  
responsibility to be some what [of a] go between to try and resolve matters 
if possible informally between staff or corrections officers and inmates or 
inmates with inmates specifically on [his] housing area (A Block) without 
causing friction by bringing matters up before the Unit Manager. 
 
App. 0151.  If Cooper’s role as a Block Representative is similar to the Inmate Legal 
Reference Aide in Wisniewski, then his actions assisting Diaz Cruz may be entitled to 
constitutional protection.  Because neither the District Court nor the parties had an 
opportunity to consider whether the role of Block Representative is similar to an Inmate 
Legal Reference Aide, we will vacate the order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s 
retaliation claim based on his assistance to Diaz Cruz and remand for consideration of his 
claim in light of Wisniewski.     
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2 
Cooper also asserts that he engaged in protected conduct, for which he was 
retaliated against, when he raised complaints about Granlund.  Granlund was Unit 
Manager for A Block.  Cooper, the A Block representative, complained to prison officials 
that: (1) officers under Granlund’s supervision were stealing from cells, (2) Granlund 
failed to intervene in housing matters, (3) Granlund acted unprofessionally, and (4) 
Granlund was biased in his investigations.3     
Assuming Cooper’s complaints about Granlund constitute protected conduct and 
that he suffered adverse consequences, this claim nonetheless fails.  Cooper must 
demonstrate a causal link between his complaints about Granlund and the adverse action 
he suffered.  Cooper stated that he raised complaints about Granlund multiple times 
throughout 2011, but provided no greater specificity concerning the timing of those 
complaints.  Although Cooper asserts that Granlund addressed him aggressively at the 
Informal Resolution hearing that followed the September 2011 misconduct reports, 
allegedly ordering him to sign the form, denying him the proper procedures under DC-
ADM 801, and denying his September 8, 2011 grievance against Sherman as “frivolous” 
                                                                
3 Appellees assert that these claims are improperly predicated on self-serving 
affidavits filed years after the incidents occurred.  While “conclusory, self-serving 
affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment,” an affidavit with 
“specific facts that reveal a genuine issue of material fact” is sufficient.  Paladino v. 
Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & 
Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Cooper’s detailed affidavit is not 
conclusory.  Moreover, while Appellees chastise Cooper’s failure to produce 
corroborating evidence, they have not denied the facts contained in those affidavits.  
Therefore, his affidavits may be considered in determining whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
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a few weeks later, Cooper presents insufficient evidence to show a link between his 
complaints about Granlund and Granlund’s September 2011 actions.  Thus, no reasonable 
jury could find that Granlund acted in retaliation for Cooper’s complaints about him.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s 
retaliation claim for complaints against Granlund. 
C 
 We next address Cooper’s procedural due process retaliation claim.  “Prison 
disciplinary proceedings may . . . constitute a denial of due process in the context of a 
civil rights action under § 1983 when they are instituted for the sole purpose of retaliating 
against an inmate for his/her exercise of a constitutional right.”  Smith v. Mensinger, 293 
F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002).  Such a procedural due process claim requires threshold 
proof of constitutionally protected conduct.  Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 
486 (1995)); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000).  Even if the 
discipline is initiated in retaliation for a protected act, however, due process is satisfied 
where the plaintiff has an opportunity to confront and challenge the retaliatory 
misconduct reports.  See Smith, 293 F.3d at 653-54.  
The District Court did not address Cooper’s procedural due process claim because 
it found he had not engaged in protected conduct.  See Cooper, 2016 WL 1271327, at *3-
5.  Because we will vacate the Court’s ruling on Cooper’s retaliation claim based on his 
assistance to Diaz Cruz for it to determine whether Cooper’s actions constitute 
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constitutionally protected conduct under Wisniewski,4 we will also vacate the order 
granting summary judgment on his due process claim.5   
D 
Cooper filed a motion to compel responses to interrogatories while Defendants’ 
summary judgment motion was pending.  Defendants lodged objections to every 
interrogatory Cooper served and provided at best minimal responses to very few.  The 
District Court denied Cooper’s motion because it was filed over a year after discovery 
closed and nineteen months after receiving Defendants’ responses.    
Pursuant to the Standing Practice Order and Local Rule 26.4, discovery closed six 
months from the date of the last pleading.  Cooper first served his interrogatories on June 
6, 2013.  On January 24, 2014, the District Court stayed discovery pending the resolution 
of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The Court resolved the motion, and thereafter 
Defendants answered Cooper’s amended complaint on May 9, 2014.  Their answer 
                                                                
4 On remand, the District Court may consider whether there are disputed material 
facts concerning this determination and the other elements of his First Amendment and 
due process retaliation claims. 
5 Cooper also appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to postpone 
consideration of Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  Consistent with Cooper’s 
representations at argument, Oral Argument at 10:22-11:10, Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
No. 16-1958 (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings, 
because we are vacating the order granting summary judgment on Cooper’s retaliation 
and procedural due process claims arising from his assistance to Diaz Cruz and these 
claims will be subject to renewed summary judgment motions, the appeal of the order 
denying his motion to postpone is deemed withdrawn.  If, in the District Court’s 
judgment, limited discovery is warranted to address the applicability of Wisniewski, then 
it may permit the parties to engage in such discovery, including serving a discrete number 
of interrogatories, document demands, and/or conducting depositions. 
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triggered the six-month discovery period, which closed on November 9, 2014.6  Cooper 
re-served his interrogatories on May 17, 2014 and Defendants served their responses on 
May 19, 2014.  Cooper’s motion to compel responses was filed nineteen months later, on 
December 21, 2015.  Cooper asserts that his delay in filing his motion was in part due to 
his transfer to a New Jersey prison to face other charges.  Even though Cooper was in 
New Jersey from June to November 2014, and even assuming he could take no action in 
this case while there, he waited more than a year after his return from New Jersey to take 
action concerning Defendants’ discovery responses.  
Applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we cannot conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Cooper’s motion when he inexplicably 
waited over nineteen months to address the deficient responses.  Furthermore, because we 
have vacated the Court’s order granting summary judgment on his due process and 
retaliation claims based upon his assistance to Diaz Cruz, Cooper has faced no “actual 
and substantial prejudice” from not having the responses he sought.  In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817, 818 (3d Cir. 1982).  Thus, we will affirm the order 
denying his motion to compel.  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part and affirm in part and remand for 
further proceedings.7 
                                                                
6 In its opinion denying Cooper’s motion to compel, the District Court stated that 
discovery closed on December 9, 2014.     
7 The District Court granted summary judgment for all individual Defendants.  
Cooper v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:12-CV-01186, 2016 WL 1294591 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 
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2016).  Cooper made no arguments regarding Lamas and Wetzel in the District Court, 
and “arguments not raised in the district courts are waived on appeal.”  United States v. 
Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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